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P.J. Blount∗ & Christian J. Robison∗ 
The United States Congress recently passed the U.S. 
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (“CSLCA”). Title 
IV of the Act ultimately recognized commercial property rights in 
resources extracted from extraterrestrial bodies. Consequently, the 
passage of such legislation has once again brought property rights 
in outer space to the forefront of legal discussion. Although some 
have said that the CSLCA directly conflicts with Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty, the CSLCA should be seen as a valid 
interpretation of Article II given the numerous ambiguities 
inherent in the article itself. More importantly, the CSCLA acts as 
an incremental mechanism in the formation of international space 
law that, in turn, should eventually allow States to come to 
innovative and cooperative solutions to preserve the Article II 
regime amidst future commercial efforts in outer space. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2015, the United States Congress passed the U.S. 
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (“CSLCA”).1 
Title IV of the Act, Space Resource Exploration and Utilization, 
ultimately recognized commercial property rights in resources 
extracted from celestial bodies.2 The CSLCA was met with 
exuberance by the commercial space sector, but many scholars 
declared that the legislation was a violation of international space 
law. For example, one commentator equated the law to a “land 
                                                
 1 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, H.R. 2262, 114th 
Cong. (2015). 
 2 ‘Celestial bodies’ is a term used in international space law. For instance, it is 
found in the third UN General Assembly that addresses outer space activities, 
which states “[o]uter space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use 
by all states.” G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), International Co-operation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (Dec. 20, 1961). The term is never defined in the treaty 
regime, and it is generally understood to encompass all naturally occurring 
bodies in the void of space other than Earth, including the Moon. See, for 
instance, the formulation in the Moon Agreement, which states “provisions of 
this agreement relating to the Moon shall also apply to the other celestial bodies 
within the solar system, other than the Earth . . . .” Agreement Governing the 
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. I, Dec. 5, 1979, 
1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. 
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grab” and suggested that the bill’s authors “should read the space 
treaties.”3 Similarly, others felt that it “represent[ed] a full-frontal 
attack on settled principles of space law,”4 or that the law violated 
the Outer Space Treaty regime altogether.5 The narrative in such 
backlash conceptualizes international space law, specifically 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, as set with static content.6 
Critics of the CSLCA may forget that the Outer Space Treaty 
was written in contemplation of innovation. The drafters were 
writing law for technology that was uncertain in its development, 
yet an immediate threat to international peace and security. As a 
result, they drafted broadly defined principles to preserve space for 
peaceful uses, but left States a wide latitude of negotiation as to the 
specific content of those principles. This was done so that the law 
could adapt as the technology emerged. Thus, innovation can be 
said to be a specific value that is embedded in international space 
law. Indeed, the Outer Space Treaty itself is an example of legal 
innovation. 
It is in this context that this article casts its opinion on the 
passage of the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act 
and its title on Space Resource Exploration and Utilization. This 
article argues that the new law constitutes State interpretation of 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty and that it is a critical piece to 
the puzzle in determining the meaning of the content of Article II. 
                                                
 3 See Trevor Batch, Obama’s New Push to Mine Outer Space Could Spark a 
Disaster, Miami Professor Warns, MIAMI NEW TIMES, (Dec. 10, 2015), 
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/obamas-new-push-to-mine-outer-space-
could-spark-a-disaster-miami-professor-warns-8105384 (quoting Dr. Sylvia 
Ospina). 
 4 See, e.g., Gbenga Oduntan, Who Owns Space? U.S. Asteroid-Mining Act is 
Dangerous and Potentially Illegal, THE CONVERSATION, (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://theconversation.com/who-owns-space-us-asteroid-mining-act-is-
dangerous-and-potentially-illegal-51073. 
 5 U.S. Space-Mining Law Seen Leading to Possible Treaty Violations, CBC 
NEWS (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/space-mining-us-
treaty-1.3339104 (citing Ram Jakhu). 
 6 Tanja Masson-Zwaan & Bob Richards, International Perspectives on Space 
Resource Rights, SPACE NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015), http://spacenews.com/op-ed-
international-perspectives-on-space-resource-rights/ (“[T]hese opinions are 
largely independent ones and not supported by international consensus.”). 
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Therefore, Part I of this article discusses the ambiguities inherent 
in Article II and reflects upon how these ambiguities leave the 
content of Article II open for negotiation. Part II provides a brief 
overview of Title IV of the CSLCA and provides a surface-level 
analysis as to how such legislation complies with certain 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. Part III argues that domestic 
legislation can be important in determining the content of 
international law. This part also includes an analysis of Title IV of 
the CSLCA in this context. The final section of this Article 
concludes by reflecting on the possible impact that CSLCA may 
have on the content of international space law. 
I. AMBIGUOUS ARTICLE II 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is fraught with ambiguity. 
It not only fails “to anticipate all the realities of our current 
world,”7 but also seems to purposely use language that allows for 
multiple conflicting interpretations that are not always 
reconcilable. Even when confronted with a “plain language”8 
reading using the purpose and scope of the treaty, Article II still 
defies a universally accepted definition. This is in large part due to 
the Cold War atmosphere that pervaded negotiations of the Outer 
Space Treaty.9 As a result, Article II is drafted in such a way that 
allows it to bend to political ideology. On the one hand, Article II 
can be read in conjunction with Article I to support a socialist 
reading that reflects communitarian exploitation of space for the 
“benefit and in the interests of all countries.”10 On the other hand, 
Article II can be read from a liberal viewpoint that frees space 
from State sovereignty, but contemplates the development of 
                                                
 7 Id. 
 8 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 9 See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and 
Challenges in the Era of Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1041, 1046 
(2004). 
  10 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. II, 
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space 
Treaty]. 
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commercial activities as a “use of space.”11 A better reading of 
Article II is likely neither socialist nor liberal. Instead, it should be 
read as anti-imperial or anti-colonial, which represents a common 
ground between Soviet communism and liberalism in the 
American tradition. Article II is carefully worded to exclude 
imperial logics from extending into space, while avoiding 
ideological differences. This section elaborates upon three specific 
ambiguities: the concept of “use and occupation,” the issue of 
private actors, and the issue of resource extraction as a type of 
appropriation.12 The first two of these issues are dealt with briefly, 
and the final one receives an in depth analysis as it cuts to the core 
of the non-appropriation principle of the Outer Space Treaty 
regime. 
A. Use and Occupation 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states, “Outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to 
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 
occupation, or by any other means.”13 It is clear that Article II, in 
conjunction with Article I,14 establishes a regime of res communis 
in outer space.15 In short, the Treaty regime allows for the free use 
and exploration of outer space and prohibits any claims of 
sovereignty as mechanism for establishing the first right. 
Specifically, Article II implements a ban on appropriating space 
through use or occupation.16 This language was chosen to 
differentiate outer space from terrestrial territories that can be 
subject to claims of national appropriation. In fact, use and 
occupation are not necessarily unlawful as a result of Article II. 
                                                
   11 Id. art. II. 
   12 See id. 
 13 See id. art. II. 
 14 Id. art. I (“Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall 
be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, 
on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall 
be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.”). 
 15 See ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 40 (2d ed. 
2010); see also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 382 (4th ed. 1997). 
   16 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. I-II. 
DEC 2016] The Exploitation of Resources in Outer Space 165 
Article I endorses States’ explicit rights to the “exploration and 
use” of outer space.17 Similarly, Article XII grants rights of 
reciprocal access to “stations, installations, equipment, and space 
vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies,” meaning that the 
drafters contemplated the possibility of occupation in terms of 
inhabitation.18 Since the Outer Space Treaty acknowledges the 
possibility of use and occupation by States, Article II’s prohibition 
is a very specific one—it is a prohibition on sovereign 
appropriation that historically resulted from such use and 
occupation.19 
This bifurcation of legal occupation from sovereignty is 
consistent with the post-colonial values that inform our 
understanding of Article II. The exclusion of sovereignty 
decreased incentives for States to engage in a tension heavy 
extraterritorial land grab, yet left the door open for innovation 
through a cooperative structure. The nature of this cooperative 
structure, elaborated upon in Article IX,20 is admittedly vague, but 
it is only meant to be a framework in which to structure the 
negotiations over new technologies. The ambiguity caused by the 
potential for long term presence on a celestial body is resolved by 
requiring the legal structure governing that presence to flow from a 
claim of jurisdiction distinct from territorial sovereignty. This is 
why Articles VI21 and VIII22 provide for, and require, other 
                                                
 17 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. I. 
 18 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. XII. 
 19 FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 60-61 
(Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 2013) (noting it is the “intention to act as sovereign in 
relation to the occupied location,” and not the occupation itself.). 
 20 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. IX (“States Parties to the Treaty 
shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall 
conduct all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties 
to the Treaty.”). 
 21 Id. art. VI (“States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international 
responsibility for national activities in outer space . . . .”). 
 22 Id. art. VIII (“A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object 
launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over 
such object . . . .”). 
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methods to extend State jurisdiction to fit commercial enterprises 
within the cooperative structure. 
B. Private Actors  
The second ambiguity caused by Article II is its application to 
private actors. This was the central claim in Nemitz v. United 
States.23 Nemitz, a United States citizen, asserted ownership of an 
asteroid and attempted to collect rent from NASA for space 
occupied on the asteroid by one of its spacecraft.24 In his claim, 
Nemitz asserted that the Outer Space Treaty is a treaty among 
States and thus did not apply to him as an individual.25 While 
Nemitz is an absurd case, it does raise a valid question of how 
Article II creates obligations for individuals. In other words, how 
can individuals be precluded from territorial appropriation? 
Scholars have been divided on the matter.26 Those who assert 
that the Treaty applies to private actors counter arguments such as 
Nemitz’s by pointing to the “any other means” language included 
in Article II.27 An extreme construction of this argument claims 
that a State grant of property rights to private actors is functionally 
an act of territorial appropriation, characterizing private property 
rights as appropriation “by any other means.”28 
Neither of these extremes fully captures the entire scope of the 
ambiguity. These two extremes treat Article II as a binary that is 
either on or off. The true ambiguity within Article II is not whether 
                                                
 23 Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 
3167042 at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004) aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. N.A.S.A., 126 
F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Robert Kelly, Nemitz v. United States, A Case of First Impression: 
Appropriation, Private Property Rights and Space Law before the Federal 
Courts of the United States, 30 J. SPACE L. 297, 300-01 (2004). 
 26 See, e.g., W.N. White Jr., Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 
46th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 175 (2003); Stephen Gorove, 
Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 11th Colloquium on the Law 
of Outer Space 40 (1968) (acknowledging that Article II of the Treaty does not 
expressly prevent private appropriation of outer space). 
 27 See Carl O. Christol, Article 2 of the 1967 Principles Treaty Revisited in 
OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 78, 78-82 (1997). 
 28 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 19, at 184-85. 
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it applies to private actors, but what limitations it places on the 
State’s ability to enable these private actors. Article II is extended 
to private actors through Article VI, which imputes upon States 
“international responsibility” for their non-governmental actors.29 
The effect of this clause is not to pass an international obligation to 
the individual that would result in an international crime. Instead, it 
makes the acts of non-governmental actors attributable to the State 
as contemplated in Article 11 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts.30 This means that 
a State is obligated to maintain control over all commercial actors, 
but it must extend rights and obligations to them within a narrow 
jurisdictional framework constructed by Article II, Article VI, and 
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty.31 
This does not preclude commercial activity, but it creates an 
interesting problem vis a vis property rights. Private interests are 
protected by States through a system of property rights including 
real, chattel, and intellectual property.32 Real property is directly 
connected to territorial sovereignty as well as the protection of 
private and commercial rights. This is why some argue that the 
                                                
 29 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. VI; see also International Institute of 
Space Law, Statement by the Board of Directors of the International Institute of 
Space Law (IISL) On Claims to Property Rights Regarding The Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, 
http://www.iislweb.org/docs/IISL_Outer_Space_Treaty_Statement.pdf 
(“[A]ccording to international law, and pursuant to Article VI, the activities of 
non-governmental entities (private parties) are national activities. The 
prohibition of national appropriation by Article II thus includes appropriation by 
non-governmental entities (i.e. private entities whether individuals or 
corporations) since that would be a national activity . . . . [Therefore], 
[a]ccording to international law, States party to a treaty are under a duty to 
implement the terms of that treaty within their national legal systems.”). 
 30 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 11, G.A. Res. 
56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) (“Conduct which is not 
attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall nevertheless be 
considered an act of that State under international law if and to the extent that 
the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.”). 
 31 See supra notes 10, 21-22 and accompanying text. 
 32 See JOHN A. MCKINSEY & DEBRA D. BURKE, CARPER’S UNDERSTANDING 
THE LAW 424 (7th ed. 2015). 
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“use” of outer space should be limited both spatially and 
temporally.33 
Article II then runs a gauntlet by allowing States to permit 
commercial activity, a liberal value, but tying it closely to the 
persona of the State, a socialist value. As a result, commercial 
activities are limited by a State’s ability to authorize activities that 
would result in a “national appropriation.”34 Therefore, the real 
ambiguity is the scope of activities that a State can control without 
appropriating space or celestial bodies. 
C. The Exploitation of Natural Resources 
These first two ambiguities lead to the third ambiguity, which 
is the central question raised by Title IV of the CSLCA—whether 
the principles of res communis prohibit the exploitation of 
removable resources in outer space. The connection between 
appropriation and resource extraction is a critical point of 
contestation in the literature on Article II, although Article II “does 
not prohibit the extraction and appropriation of natural 
resources.”35 Despite the lack of a textual, affirmative prohibition, 
Article II does place some limitations on States vis a vis their 
ability to extract resources as Article II may “constitut[e] an 
absolute legal barrier in the realization of every kind of space 
activity.”36 This paper argues that this is the result of a post-
colonial construction that sought to prevent the spatial expansion 
of geopolitics. Consequently, there is an undefined gap between 
the act of “appropriating” and the act of “using” space resources. 
                                                
 33 See, e.g., Brendan Cohen, Use Versus Appropriation of Outer Space: The 
Case for Long-Term Occupancy Rights, 2014 INT’L INST. SPACE LAW PROC. 35, 
35-52. 
 34 See Center For Research of Air and Space Law, International and 
Interdisciplinary Workshop on Policy and Law Relating to Outer Space 
Resources: Examples of the Moon, Mars and Other Celestial Bodies, 16 (2006) 
(“This prohibition of appropriation by states extends through Art. IV of the 
Outer Space Treaty also to privacy nationals.”). 
 35 Id. 
 36 I.H.PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAW 28 (2d 
rev. ed., 1999). 
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Writing in the period between the end of the Second World 
War and the dawn of the Space Age, legal theorist Carl Schmitt 
argued that the history of international law could be traced through 
“land appropriation,” which is the “primeval act in founding 
law.”37 Schmitt’s analysis is meant to illustrate that post-1945 
international law was meant to construct a new spatial order to 
govern the entirety of the globe. This order entrenched borders by 
linking sovereignty to territory.38 The entrenchment of territorial 
borders was a mechanism through which the great powers sought 
to contain the imperial impulses that had repeatedly led to war. The 
emergence of space technology presented a fundamental challenge 
to the spatial order of international law by opening up the 
possibility of the spatial expansion of the State. The Outer Space 
Treaty brings space technology into international law, and Article 
II is an attempt to maintain the spatial order constructed by the 
United Nations Charter. 
Therefore, complications result when Article II is read to 
implicate property rights directly, since “appropriation” is 
primarily concerned with the expansion of State territory, not 
property. It is the indirect connection between the spatial concepts 
of territory and property that creates an unresolved ambiguity. 
Some scholars would assert that general prohibition against claims 
of sovereignty in outer space extend to the exploitation of natural 
resources.39 For instance, noted scholar Stephen Gorove asserts that 
“because the Outer Space Treaty never makes a distinction 
between outer space and its natural resources . . . the term outer 
space must be understood as resources. Moreover, the 
appropriation of natural resources for the exclusive benefit of the 
user appears to be in contrast with [Article I].”40 Such 
                                                
 37 CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 45 (G.L. Ulmen trans, Telos Press ed., 2003). 
 38 See U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
 39 See, e.g., STEPHEN GOROVE, STUDIES IN SPACE LAW: ITS CHALLENGES AND 
PROSPECTS 82 (Sijthoff A. Leiden ed., 1977) (“[A]ny use involving consumption 
or taking [of natural resources] with intention of keeping for one’s own 
exclusive use would amount to appropriation.”). 
 40 FABIO TRONCHETTI, THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE 
MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES – A PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL REGIME 32 
(2009) (citing Stephen Gorove, Limitations on the Principles of Freedom of 
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interpretations compress territory, real property, and chattel 
property in such a way that resource extraction is a functional 
equivalent to appropriation. In contrast, other commentators have 
argued that the right to freely explore and use outer space is 
analogous with the rules underlying other res communis regimes 
such as the high seas.41 In sum, these authors argue that “States 
[and private actors] are entitled to appropriate outer space natural 
resources so long as their activities do not involve any permanent 
appropriation of . . . the areas in which resources are appropriated 
and until such activities do not prevent other[s] . . . from doing the 
same.”42 
Again, while both of these groups make compelling arguments, 
it is important to remember that Article II applies to the concept of 
territory and not to property. Article II functions to exclude outer 
space from the territory of States, thus appropriation only occurs 
when property rights flow from territorial claims.43 Therefore, we 
must inquire about the legal condition of property in spatial areas 
designated outside the borders of any State. In international law, 
such areas are known res communis and are held as a global 
                                                                                                         
Exploration and Use in Outer Space, 13th Colloquium on the Law of Outer 
Space 40 (1970)). 
 41 See BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 230 (1997); CARL 
Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 41 (1982) 
(referencing the Outer Space Treaty’s corresponding travaux preparatoires). 
 42 TRONCHETTI, supra note 40, at 221 (emphasis added) (citing Outer Space 
Treaty, art. IX.). 
 43 Although Article I does require that use and exploration be done for the 
benefit and interests of all States, this obligation is a soft one. This is different 
from the “common heritage of mankind” principle as applied to the deep sea 
bed, which places an obligation on states to share the resources that they gain 
from the deep sea bed. There is no firm obligation on how to share these 
benefits, and as such, sharing has occurred on an ad hoc basis, such as the 
sharing of satellite remote sensing data. See generally, G.A. Res. 51/122, Annex 
¶ 2, Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into 
Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (Dec. 13, 1996) (“States 
are free to determine all aspects of their participation in international 
cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space on an equitable and 
mutually acceptable basis.”). 
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commons by the international system.44 Global commons is a legal 
typology; it is a term used to denote an area that is outside of the 
sovereign control of a nation-state and not subject to claims of 
territorial sovereignty. Two aspects of this delineation should be 
made clear. 
First, the term global commons is a typology of legal space in 
international law. This is important because the term “commons” 
finds its roots in Roman law as well as English common law, but 
has traditionally been used to address economic or property 
interests. This has caused confusion because commons in 
international law, at its core, is a settlement of territory and not 
property.45 While economic and property interests are implicated in 
spatial settlements, international law is structured through the 
allocation territory among sovereigns to avert international 
conflict.46 Global commons, as part of this spatial matrix, is 
primarily about rights of exclusion maintained by States. 
Second, as a legal typology, the global commons is a term that 
only has general legal content. It can only describe the legal state 
of a global commons in the least restrictive sense. It follows that 
each commons has its own internal lex specialis that applies within 
the framework of international law. Thus, the high seas,47 the deep 
seabed,48 Antarctica,49 and outer space all have distinct legal 
regimes that create unique rights and obligations for States. This 
                                                
 44 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
 45 Some argue that outer space is not a “global commons.” Such analysis 
mistakenly treats Article II as primarily concerned with property and engages in 
a historical analysis of “commons.” This mistake is further complicated by the 
assertion that because the word “commons” does not appear in the Outer Space 
Treaty, which ignores “global commons” as a legal typology in international 
law. See, e.g., HENRY HERTZFELD, BRIAN WEEDEN & CHRISTOPHER D. 
JOHNSON, HOW SIMPLE TERMS MISLEAD US: THE PITFALLS OF THINKING ABOUT 
OUTER SPACE AS A COMMONS, 2015 INT’L ASTRONAUTICAL CONGRESS 
PROCEEDINGS, http://swfound.org/media/205285/how-simple-terms-mislead-us-
hertzfeld-johnson-weeden-iac-2015.pdf. 
 46 Such a concept has been described as the “bracketing of war.” SCHMITT, 
supra note 37, at 55. 
 47 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 86-120, Nov. 16, 1994, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 48 See id. at arts. 122-23 (defining enclosed or semi-enclosed seas). 
 49 The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794. 402 U.N.T.S. 71. 
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means that for each global commons, States are free to adopt a lex 
specialis that they perceive as the proper balance between 
international peace and security and their own self-interests. Each 
commons results from a settlement that reflects the physical 
characteristics of the area, current technology, historical 
perspectives, and specific geopolitics at the time of negotiation. 
With such consideration, States can allow for the presence of 
national jurisdictions within these spaces. 
The crux of the question is whether an appropriation of 
territorial sovereignty occurs “by any other means” through the 
extraction of outer space resources.50 In the face of this interpretive 
ambiguity, many have turned to the analogy of the law of the sea 
and the extraction of fish on the high seas.51 While the analogy is 
limited in its ability to elucidate specific legal principles, it does 
confirm the existence of legal extraction of resources in a global 
commons. In both the law of the sea and the law of Antarctica, 
resource extraction is addressed in specific clauses that make clear 
the extent to which commercial extraction can occur.52 Resource 
extraction for commercial purposes therefore can be interpreted as 
a valid “use” under general international law governing global 
commons, and the lack of a specific clause prohibiting such 
extraction within the body of space law is indicative of it being a 
valid use within the lex specialis of outer space. To that end, 
Article II leaves significant gaps that cannot be filled by 
comparison to other global commons which specify the extent to 
                                                
 50 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. II. 
 51 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 52 The “high seas” is designated as an area of broad liberal usage. See 
UNCLOS, supra note 47, art. 87. The extraction of resources from the deep 
seabed is governed by an international authority. See id. art. 136-37, 156. Any 
commercial exploitation of mineral resources in Antarctica is prohibited. 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 7, Jan. 14, 
1998. Resource extraction was one of the issues that the Moon Agreement was 
supposed to resolve through adoption of a system similar to the deep sea bed. 
See Moon Agreement, supra note 2, art. XI; see also Fabio Tronchetti, Moon 
Agreement in the 21st Century: Addressing Its Potential Role in the Era of 
Commercial Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, 36 J. SPACE L. 489 (2010). 
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which States can exploit resources. In sum, failed agreements53 to 
cure this error signifies that the specific prohibitions regarding 
extraterrestrial resource extraction and exploitation contained 
Article II are unsettled. 
II. THE CSCLA 
As noted, the Title IV of the CSLCA is the most recent, and 
most profound, American interpretation of the Article II regime. 
This particular piece of domestic legislation has developed over 
the course of several years to finally reveal the United States’ 
position on the exploitation of natural resources by private 
commercial actors in relation to its Outer Space Treaty obligations. 
This section first provides a brief overview of the development of 
the text of Title IV. The next section then provides a surface-level 
analysis regarding Title IV’s compatibility with the provisions of 
the Outer Space Treaty. 
A. Development of CSCLA Title IV 
In 2014, the House Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology received the newly introduced “American Space 
Technology for Exploring Resource Opportunities In Deep Space 
Act,” or the “ASTEROIDS Act.”54 Although this bill may not have 
been introduced as one that could become actual legislation, the 
proposed legislation did lead to discussion of private property 
rights in outer space that ultimately led to the inclusion of Title IV 
in the CSLCA. 
 The ASTEROIDS Act explicitly provided property rights 
over outer space resources to private commercial entities.55 That is, 
the legislation stated that, “[a]ny resources obtained in outer space 
from an asteroid are the property of the entity that obtained such 
resources, which shall be entitled to all property rights thereto, 
consistent with applicable provisions of Federal law.”56 Although 
                                                
 53 See, e.g., Moon Agreement, supra note 2. 
 54 American Space Technology for Exploring Resource Opportunities In Deep 
Space Act, H.R. 5063, 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter ASTEROIDS Act]. 
 55 See id. 
 56 Id. 
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this phrase in itself does not necessarily abrogate “existing 
international obligations of the United States”57 by explicitly 
asserting claims of sovereignty over said resources, a literal 
reading of this text, absent a definition58 of outer space resources, 
does in fact allow one to conclude that American legislators may 
have incidentally undermined the core principles of Article II by 
providing property rights that may conflict with the obligation to 
not appropriate space by means of use or occupation.59 
 This particular concern remained as the initial 
ASTEROIDS Act proceeded to be amended. In regards to House 
Bill 1508 (“H.R. 1508”) or the “Space Resources Exploration and 
Utilization Act of 2015,”60 a group of commentators believed that 
“the bill [as drafted] could be read to allow for expansive territorial 
claims over both asteroids and planetary surfaces well beyond 
what can be justified on the basis of Article IX’s non-interference 
principle . . . .”61 Such a matter was only complicated by a 
seemingly broad, yet narrow, definition of outer spaces resources 
and a subsequent provision that assigned private property rights 
only to resources extracted from an asteroid.62 Ultimately, the 
initial drafts of the ASTEROIDS Act and H.R. 1508 were amended 
to become Title IV of CSLCA and signed into law by President 
Barack Obama on November 25, 2015.63 It should be noted that 
                                                
 57 Id. 
 58 The initial ASTEROIDS Act did not define outer space resources. See 
ASTEROIDS Act supra note 54. 
 59 See supra notes 10, 11, and accompanying text. 
 60 Space Resources Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, H.R. 1508, 114th 
Cong. (2015). 
 61 Berin Szoka & James Dunstan, Letter to Bill Posey & Derek Kilmer, 
Members of Congress (May 19, 2015), 
http://docs.techfreedom.org/TF_Letter_Re_Amendments_to_HR_1508.pdf 
[hereinafter TechFreedom Letter]. 
 62 H.R. 1508, supra note 60, defined a “space resource” as “a natural resource 
of any kind found in situ in outer space,” and an “asteroid resource as “a space 
resource found on or within a single asteroid.” H.R. 1508, supra note 60. 
Consequently, the same commentators as noted above believed that “the bill 
[was] also too narrow, in conferring property rights only over resources 
extracted from asteroids, rather than all space resources.” TechFreedom Letter, 
supra note 61. 
   63 See ASTEROIDS Act, supra note 54, at Title IV. 
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Title IV was tacked onto a larger bill that contained a number of 
critical updates to United States space law.64 These changes had 
little to nothing to do with extraterrestrial resources and were 
primarily concerned with improving government administration of 
the increasing commercialization of space. Incorporating Title IV 
into this larger bill likely made the controversial legislation easier 
to pass. 
B. Initial Impressions of CSCLA Title IV 
On its face, the CSLCA’s provision regarding private property 
rights in outer space seems to be only a more specific description 
of the rights proposed by the initial ASTEROIDS Act. The Act’s 
provision regarding private ownership of resources in outer space 
states: 
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of 
an asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter 
shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource 
obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell 
the asteroid resource or space resource obtained in 
accordance with applicable law, including the international 
obligations of the United States.65 
This change in language is quite important. Instead of granting 
the ambiguous “property rights,” Title IV enumerates certain rights 
from the traditional bundle of rights that a commercial entity might 
have over chattel property.66 Therefore, the rights granted by Title 
IV are narrower than the rights granted in the ASTEROIDS Act, 
making them less likely to run afoul of the prohibitions found in 
Article II. 
 Simply put, this particular language does a better job in 
ensuring that private entities only have property rights to resources 
extracted from asteroids or other celestial bodies. Moreover, the 
                                                
   64 See id. 
 65 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, H.R. 2262, 114th 
Cong. § 402 (2015). 
   66 See ASTEROIDS Act, supra note 54, at Title IV. 
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more specific definition of outer space resources as contained in 
the Act further insinuates that private entities only have rights to 
resources and not to the body from which they were extracted. In 
that respect, the Act specifically defines two categories of 
resources: asteroid resources67 and space resources.68 It further 
elaborates the definition of space resources to include “water and 
minerals.”69 By narrowly defining the rights that entities have to 
such resources, American legislators have arguably avoided 
showing an intent to allow private entities to have exclusive 
control over a celestial body or a portion of a celestial body from 
which resources could be extracted. In fact, the concluding 
language of the Act, language that was absent in both the 
ASTEROIDS Act and H.R. 1508, explicitly reaffirms the United 
States’ intent to comply with Article II by stating, “this Act . . . 
does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights 
or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.”70 
 Despite the United States’ attempt to demonstrate that it 
does not condone violations of Article II, Title IV does not contain 
many explicit provisions that would necessarily prevent private 
entities from compromising other important Treaty provisions, 
specifically Article IX’s prohibition against “harmful 
interference.”71 For example, a private entity could rightfully lay 
claim to resources from an asteroid or other celestial body, but 
could wrongfully make a claim of “harmful interference” against 
another party who may attempt to extract resources from the same 
body that is not subject to the jurisdiction of any one State or 
private actor. This in effect would violate the principle of Article II 
by indirectly laying exclusive claims to a particular body in outer 
space. In this context though, it must be noted that a reporting 
requirement was included requiring the President to prepare a 
report on “the authorities necessary to meet the international 
obligations of the United States, including authorization and 
                                                
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. IX; TechFreedom letter, supra note 
61. 
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continuing supervision by the Federal Government.”72 Ultimately, 
while hypothetical violations can be posited, it seems as though the 
United States intends to promulgate regulations that fulfill its 
obligations under Article II as well as Article VI and Article IX of 
the Outer Space Treaty. 
III. THE CSLCA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
As noted above, one of the primary criticisms of Title IV of the 
CSLCA is that it violates Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.73 In 
light of the ambiguities laid out in the initial sections of this article, 
this position seems fraught with problems. If, as this Article 
argues, the content of Article II is yet to be determined, then a 
more balanced approach is to read Title IV as a state interpretation 
of the content of Article II. To that end, this section proceeds in 
two parts. The first part discusses how domestic legislation can 
help build the meaning of international law. Consequently, the 
second part analyzes Title IV in this schema of international law. 
A. Filling the Gaps in International Law 
The ambiguities of Article II cannot be sufficiently resolved by 
applying a few general sources of international law. In fact, the 
interpretation and application of international obligations are 
ultimately dependent upon the actions of various States as they 
engage in the process of fulfilling their treaty obligations. This 
means that international law grows incrementally as States act and 
react within legal lacunae. Analysis of the incremental growth of 
law can assist in deciphering how Article II has developed beyond 
its text in regards to resource extraction. 
Noted scholar Michael Reisman argued that “international 
incidents” form the “epistemic units” on which international law is 
built.74 Under Reisman’s international incident model, international 
law is formed at decision points in which practitioners, such as 
                                                
 72 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, H.R. 2262, 114th 
Cong. § 402 (2015). 
 73 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
 74 W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre 
in the Study of International Law, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 12-15 (1984). 
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diplomats, interpret and apply the law, much like a judge in a 
common law system.75 What Reisman’s scholarship indicates is 
that the content of international law is a function of State 
interpretation which can be observed as States face unexpected 
incidents that reveal rifts in international law. These epistemic 
moments reveal the political construction of the law, as well as the 
extent to which States understand their own international 
obligations.76 
Reisman’s work gives a lens to international law that takes us 
beyond the text of a treaty and into the construction of content 
across time and space. International incidents serve as glosses on 
the formal text of international law as found in treaties or custom. 
There is no need to limit these epistemic units to Reisman’s 
“international incidents.” International law is extremely amorphous 
in nature, and while the “text” of international law comes from 
traditional negotiations within international fora, the content of 
international law is often in the subtext derived from multiple 
points of informal negotiation. 
Such processes are revealed in the academic interest in the 
formation of “soft law” in international space law.77 Soft law 
comes in many forms, which are all understood to be non-binding 
agreements such as technical guidelines or best practices.78 Soft 
law is indicative of the rhizomatic nature of norm development in 
international space law. The old model characterized by the active 
negotiation of treaties has increasingly given way to less formal 
mechanisms through which States are defining the nature of 
responsible behavior in space.79 This does not mean that the well of 
                                                
 75 Id. at 5–7. 
 76 See id. at 2–3. 
 77 For a sample of the literature on soft law and outer space activities, see 
generally IRMGARD MARBOE, SOFT LAW IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION OF 
NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW (2012). 
 78 P.J. Blount, Renovating Space: The Future of International Space Law, 40 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 515, 525–27 (2012). 
 79 On the shifting nature of international space law making, see Sergio 
Marchisio, The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal Subcommittee of the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), 31 J. 
SPACE L. 219, 219–42 (2005). 
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space law has dried. Rather, it is indicative of numerous springs 
welling up and contributing to the flow of international space law. 
Soft law and international incidents represent two of these 
types of sources. Specific to this article, domestic law and policy 
can be another source of law that States use to fill the gaps found 
in international law. An excellent example of this is the migration 
of “non-discriminatory access” to remote sensing data from 
domestic American law into the United Nations Principles on 
Remote Sensing.80 In essence, States are still negotiating the 
content of international space law, but that “negotiation” is not 
happening in the formal sense of a diplomatic meeting of State 
parties. It is instead happening in an arena of complexity that might 
be more akin to a multidimensional chess game. In such an arena, 
States often interpret international law and pose that interpretation 
to the international community through domestic action. This 
“conversation” begins to mark the contours of the content of 
international law.81 
As States work out the content of ambiguous terms in 
international law, State legislation plays an important role in 
revealing state interpretations of legal rights and obligations, 
especially when States enact legislation that is meant to comport 
with international law. In such scenarios, the legislation itself 
becomes an important epistemic unit in analyzing the content of 
                                                
 80 See generally Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, The Perils of Landsat from 
Grassroots to Globalization: A Comprehensive Review of US Remote Sensing 
Law with a Few Thoughts for the Future, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 45 (2005); JOANNE 
IRENE GABRYNOWICZ, THE LAND REMOTE SENSING LAWS AND POLICIES OF 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: A GLOBAL SURVEY (2007), 
http://www.olemiss.edu/programs/spacelaw/resources/pdfs/noaa.pdf. 
 81 A good example of this is the interpretation of Article IX that was 
articulated through actions of China and the United States in the aftermath of 
their respective ASAT tests in 2007 and 2008. See K.K. Nair, China’s ASAT 
Test: A Demonstrated Need for Legal Reform, 33 J. SPACE L. 191, 191–94 
(2007); Eugene Marder, Center For Defense Information, CPR for the OST: 
How China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons Test Can Breathe New Life into Article IX 
of the Outer Space Treaty, (2008) (on file with author); Michael C. Mineiro, FY-
1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal Obligations Under 
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty.” 34 J. SPACE L. 321, 455–57 (2008); P.J. 
Blount, Developments in Space Security and Their Legal Implications, 44 
LAW/TECHNOLOGY 2, 30–36 (2011). 
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international law. This phenomenon is not native to space law. 
Domestic law making should not be confused with international 
law making in a formal sense, and this article does not argue that 
recent American legislation on extraterrestrial resource extraction 
constitutes international law. Instead, this article argues that the 
Act represents the United States’ understanding of its obligations 
under Article II. This position places other States in the position of 
wrestling with these terms and determining whether the United 
States legislation is a valid interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty 
regime. 
B. Reconciling the CSLCA with Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty 
The threshold question surrounding Title IV is whether the Act 
violates Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. The ambiguities that 
fragment Article II indicate multiple valid interpretations of the 
law and give no clear interpretation based in the text of 
international space law itself.82 In this light, the United States 
interpretation is not precluded by the text of the Treaty, especially 
in light of the careful language contained in the Act that 
acknowledges and incorporates the international obligations found 
in the Treaty itself. Indeed, the U.S. legislation specifically 
disclaims territorial sovereignty, which is tied directly to the non-
appropriation principle in Article II.83 It should be made clear, 
however, that a disclaimer of territorial sovereignty is not a 
disclaimer of national jurisdiction. National jurisdiction extends 
into all global commons through a variety of means and, in space, 
specifically through Article VI and Article VIII of the Outer Space 
Treaty.84 The extension of jurisdiction is not a de facto extension of 
sovereignty, as can be seen in Article VIII of the Treaty which 
                                                
 82 See generally Int’l Inst. of Space Law, Position Paper on Space Resource 
Mining, (2015), http://www.iislweb.org/docs/SpaceResourceMining.pdf. 
 83 See supra note 65 and accompanying text; U.S. Commercial Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, § 402, 129 Stat. 704, 720-22 (2015), 
https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ90/PLAW-114publ90.pdf. 
 84 On jurisdiction in space, see generally P.J. Blount, Jurisdiction in Outer 
Space: Challenges of Private Individuals in Space, 33 J. SPACE L. 299 (2007). 
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affirmatively grants to States “jurisdiction and control” over 
spacecraft on their registries.85 
What this means is that this important concern in relation to 
Title IV is not whether it violates international law but instead, 
what it tells us about the content of Article II. This distinction 
focuses on Title IV as a valid interpretation of Article II but not 
necessarily the valid interpretation of Article II. As an epistemic 
unit in the negotiation of international law, Title IV is a State 
interpretation that raises questions of whether other States will 
accept the interpretation or not.86 Contemporary geopolitics aside, 
if all other States decided to reject the United States interpretation 
as a rule of custom, they would force the United States to either 
capitulate or to maintain status as a persistent objector of sorts.87 
States are just as capable of coming together and forging 
agreements that make resource extraction subject to a regime such 
as the Deep Seabed Authority as contemplated in the Moon 
Agreement.88 States can negotiate the particular legal structures 
governing specific activities in the outer space environment, thus 
indicating that Title IV’s importance will be measured in the extent 
to which the international community confirms or negates the 
American position. To date, there has been no outright diplomatic 
reaction. 
Ultimately, the significance of Title IV, is in its ability to shape 
the future content of international space law. Since States are free 
to reject or accept the U.S. interpretation of Title IV, international 
reaction will be of the utmost importance. Unless States reject the 
interpretation, the howls of “illegality” coming from numerous 
academics will be like trees falling in empty woods. In short, Title 
IV can be read as the continuation of U.S. State practice in relation 
                                                
 85 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. VIII. 
 86 Position Paper, supra note 82. 
 87 “Persistent objector” is a term associated with customary international law 
and not treaty law. The terms here denotes an instance where a State refuses to 
accept the general interpretation of a treaty clause when the content is 
ambiguous subject to development through processes similar to the development 
of international custom (i.e. through the establishment of opinio juris and state 
practice). 
 88 See Moon Agreement, supra note 2, art. 11. 
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to Article II. For instance, the plaque at the base of the American 
flag planted by the Apollo 12 mission disclaims sovereignty, yet 
the United States extracted resources in the form of moon rocks 
and maintains ownership over those rocks.89 Title IV extends a 
similar right to resource extraction without territorial claims to 
private actors. If other States do not contest this extension, then it 
is reasonable to interpret Title IV as legislation that represents a 
step towards defining the content of Article II and the law 
concerning the specific activity of space mining. 
This does not mean that Title IV represents a settlement of the 
content of Article II. Indeed, Title IV does not even represent a 
final settlement of US domestic law in relation to extraterrestrial 
resource extraction as evinced by the reporting requirements on the 
proper regulatory regime to manage these activities.90 Title IV does 
represent an incremental advance in our understanding of the 
international rights and obligations contained within the 
ambiguous text, and it may very well be an important epistemic 
point as commercial actors further imbricate themselves in use and 
exploration of outer space. 
IV. DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
If Title IV does become an accepted interpretation of Article II 
by States, then a number of issues will arise that must be addressed 
at the international level because the extension of State jurisdiction 
over commercial entities operating in outer space will require 
States to establish a regime through which these activities can be 
coordinated. This regime will be needed to, among other things, 
ensure safe and sustainable operations in space, to ensure 
commercial actors’ investments in operations, and to maintain 
international peace and security in space activities. Title IV 
represents a possible avenue through which States may engage in 
cooperative efforts to preserve the Article II regime while at the 
                                                
 89 The Apollo 11 Memorial on the Moon, NASA, 
http://starchild.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/StarChild/space_level2/apollo11_plaque.html 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
 90 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. 114-90 
§ 402. 
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same time facilitating the development of commercial resource 
extraction in outer space.91 
As suggested above, one of the core goals of international law 
is to structure a stable and peaceful existence among States. As a 
result, States negotiate international law as sovereign equals that 
must balance between their own self-interests and the interests of 
the international community as a whole. States are often 
confronted with the need to address evolving technology and its 
tendency to challenge core questions of sovereignty. For instance, 
international telecommunications under the International 
Telecommunication Union (“ITU”) and international aviation 
under International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”) are both 
examples of international collaboration on technical issues that 
carry political implications.92 These regimes represent the ability of 
States to adopt technical regimes that do not compromise the core 
principle of territorial sovereignty. 
Space resource extraction presents a similar problem in that it 
begs the non-trivial question of the point at which an “exploration 
and use” of outer space becomes an appropriation through which a 
State has extended its sovereign territorial claims. This raises a 
question that was not fully contemplated in the post-1945 
settlement.93 Technology in 1945 was a challenge because it 
permeated borders, but space technology forced international law 
to contend with a new ability to extend borders. Article II is an 
attempt to “extraterritorialize” outer space and celestial bodies. 
States, in light of the uncertainties in evolving technologies, were 
unable to directly answer the limits of state power within a new, 
undefined global commons which results in the Article II 
ambiguities. It is submitted that there is no immediate need for 
States to resolve directly the limits of State power in outer space. 
This paper argues that the international community, without ever 
                                                
 91 The term “regime” in this context is used loosely and can be fulfilled 
through both formal and informal coordination mechanisms. 
 92 Notably, it has been argued that the ITU regulates orbital slots as space 
resources. See, e.g., Philip de Man, Rights Over Areas vs. Resources in Outer 
Space: What’s the Use of Orbital Slots? 38 J. SPACE L. 39 (2012). 
 93 See Ctr. For Research of Air and Space Law, supra note 34 and 
accompanying text. 
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touching on problematic issues of sovereignty, can pursue 
mechanisms that could engender stability through international 
coordination. By focusing on technical standards and coordination 
of information sharing, such as that seen in ICAO or the ITU, 
States can engage in a cooperative regime that both secures outer 
space and facilitates its use and exploration. 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty becomes critical in 
developing such a regime. If States agree at the international level 
on standards of conduct, then those standards can be implemented 
domestically through Article VI’s authorization and supervision 
requirements.94 For instance, safety standards create specific rules 
that guide responsible conduct and maintain predictability in a 
given environment. For example, though not explicitly classified as 
safety standards, the coordination process maintained by the ITU 
in regards to the geosynchronous orbit ultimately encourages 
responsible conduct and predictability in this sphere of outer 
space.95 In the context of the ITU, this allows States to divorce 
political questions from that of safe operations, which allows them 
to explicitly avoid the implicit question of sovereignty and its 
fundamental ambiguities. 
It is posited then, that in order to achieve the goals of security 
and sustainability in space as well as commercial uses of outer 
space, States will need to expand their cooperation in the field of 
technical safety standards and information sharing. This can, and 
likely will, develop incrementally from a variety of directions. The 
domestic legislation of various States will play a role by setting 
legal parameters for subsets of actors, and these laws will in turn 
formulate accepted practices maintained by certain operators. 
Indeed, the power of domestic legislation to create internationally 
accepted standards can be seen in the proliferation of the 
“maximum probable loss standard” from US law and into the laws 
                                                
 94 The Federal Aviation Administration’s letter to Bigelow Aerospace on 
payload review suggests such an approach. See Jeff Faust, FAA Review a Small 
Step for Lunar Commericialization Efforts, SPACE NEWS, (Feb. 6, 2015), 
http://spacenews.com/faa-review-a-small-step-for-lunar-commercialization-
efforts/. 
 95 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 19, at 229-44. 
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of a variety of nations.96 In addition to domestic legislation, States 
can also pursue law and policy options at the international level. 
This includes using mechanisms that increase information sharing 
such as the Hague Code of Conduct,97 agreements that set out state 
best practices like the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines,98 
formal treaties, technical standards, and even international 
organizations. Indeed, this is the approach that was adopted by the 
United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, which endorsed 
the development of transparency and confidence building measures 
as critical to the continued safety and security of outer space. 
Safety standards and information sharing facilitate routine 
interactions and decrease operational risk by increasing 
predictability. This decreases the risk of conflict through mishap in 
a high security environment. Not only do these standards increase 
security among States, but they also facilitate commercial 
enterprises by increasing certainty for commercial investors. As 
the need for coordination increases with the proliferation of actors 
and technologies, safety has the unique ability to serve as the 
common language through which States can maximize self-interest 
through international coordination. 
                                                
 96 Maximum probable loss, which is the extent to which space launch 
providers need to obtain private insurance, is an innovation first developed in 
American law. It has been adopted and adapted by a number of States including 
Australia, Korea, and France. See Sara M. Langston, Suborbital Flights: A 
Comparative Analysis of National and International Law, 37 J. SPACE L. 299, 
324, 353 (2011); Sang Myon-Rhee, Current Status and Recent Developments in 
Korea’s National Space Laws, 35 J. Space L. 523, 535-36 (2009); A. Kerrest de 
Rozavel & F.G. von der Dunk, Liability and Insurance in the Context of 
National Authorisation, in National Space Legislation in Europe: Issues of 
Authorisation of Private Space Activities in the Light of Developments in 
European Space Cooperation 15 (2011), 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelaw/78. 
 97 Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 
http://www.hcoc.at/?tab=what_is_hcoc&page=text_of_the_hcoc (last visited 
October 22, 2016). 
 98 IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, SPATIALIZATIONS LIBRARY 
(September 2007), 
http://library.blountsfolly.com/space/files/original/1fcb7b753c13bab2f534bc552
57f85aa.pdf. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since the bulk of companies that are seeking to take advantage 
of the new United States regulations are still decks of PowerPoint 
slides seeking funding, the nation is likely decades away from 
seeing the first resource extraction activities in outer space. This 
means that the debate over Article II and Title IV is likely to 
continue, but will ultimately be decided by the international 
community. Consequently, whether the United States interpretation 
is accepted or not will be important, but it is equally important to 
track how the law develops in other countries and specifically how 
these countries interpret their obligations under Article II.99 
Hopefully, spacefaring States will realize that mechanisms that 
drive international coordination, such as the development of 
routine safety standards, are the key components in maintaining 
international stability in the advent of extraterrestrial resource 
extraction. All things considered, Title IV is an important step 
forward, but it should not be overplayed as it still only represents 
“one small step” in this emerging sphere of space exploration. But 
with time, this one small step may eventually reflect “one giant 
leap” for the future of resource extraction in outer space. 
 
                                                
 99 For example, one commentator has argued that the Austrian Mining Act is a 
“role model” for developing commercial exploitation within the framework of 
Article II. Anita Rinner, Space Exploration—Digging in a Legal Vacuum, 57 
PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 221, 228–29 (2014). 
